


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The German Tribune

Bonn, 31 October 1982
First Year - No. 1058 - By air

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Security and Europe dominate Kohl-Mitterrand agenda

Security and European integration were main issues at the two-day Franco-German summit in Bonn. The two leaders, Chancellor Helmut Kohl and President François Mitterrand, met twice for bilateral talks. The two countries' foreign, defence, economic affairs, finance, labour and research ministers also met. Topics ranged from bilateral cooperation and new concepts in security policy to East-West ties and the European Community.

Issue of French nuclear weapons will not be discussed at the Geneva talks. This was agreed between Chancellor Kohl and President Mitterrand in Bonn.

It was one topic where Bonn and Paris have disagreed in the past: Chancellor Schmidt had insisted that the French nuclear deterrent be included in the talks.

The inclusion of security policy on the agenda added a special note to this 40th round of Franco-German consultations.

It was, for one, a note of continuity, since Herr Schmidt and M. Mitterrand had agreed on the addition, although the public effect is likely to be greater than the practical significance.

Bonn is naturally interested in persuading Paris to cooperate more closely with Nato's military set-up. But a French return to the full Nato fold is way beyond anything one might realistically expect.

Bonn is also keenly interested in learning how the French plan to deploy their Pluto tactical missiles which have a range of scarcely 100 kilometres.

From their launching pads in eastern France the missiles have a range that would take them no further than Baden-Württemberg or, at most, Hesse.

Information on what France has in mind is all Bonn envisages. Paris has never accepted any interference in its nuclear planning and Bonn has no intention of influencing the deployment of France's nuclear deterrent.

France is interested in collaboration because it might help to cut the cost of conventional arms, which Paris can barely afford once it has paid its enormous nuclear bills.

But Bonn, too, is short of cash, so there are limits to the extent to which Defence Minister Manfred Wörner can go.

He has no funds available for projects such as the joint battle tank the benefit of which must be seen more on the political plane than in practical benefit for the Bundeswehr.

Much though Bonn may welcome regular consultations on security policy, it is well appreciated that there is a risk of other friendly countries misunderstanding this hobnobbing between Paris and Bonn.

Attempts are being made to forestall any such misunderstandings. Herr Wörner has noted more than once as Defence Minister that there must be no impression of France and Germany wanting to dictate security policy to other Nato countries in Europe.

Chancellor Kohl has made much the same point in saying that in security policy there can be no mutually exclusive choice between France or the United States. Bonn relies on both as allies. The Federal Republic of Germany's security depends on the United States, and Franco-German cooperation in military matters must not be allowed to convey the impression that Bonn has forgotten the fact.

Volker Jacobs
(Sanktbrücker Zeitung, 23 October 1982)

... and Chancellor in London

Chancellor Kohl in London with British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

(Photo: dpa)



Exchange of views with Mrs Thatcher at Downing Street

British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Bonn Chancellor Helmut Kohl did not spend their time settling specific problems and announcing solutions when they met for the first time, in London.

They were more concerned about sounding out points of view and aims. As a result, both are clearer about where they stand. That will be useful when the Bonn round of British-German talks takes place.

It is too early to say whether Mrs Thatcher and Herr Kohl have hit it off personally, but we can be sure their relationship is not as cool and formal as it seemed on the steps of No. 10.

Since the Falklands campaign, the two have similar views on how to cope with it.

Herr Kohl emphasised views shared within the West. "It is important for us Europeans," he said, "to stand our ground as the European column of the Atlantic bridge."

"Differences of opinion with the United States are negligible given the major tasks we must jointly face within the alliance."

In European affairs he stressed joint responsibility for solidarity. "There may be clashes of interest in such a community but they cannot be allowed to divert attention from the Community's principal objectives."

One such clash was over steel exports to the United States, which were a major issue discussed during the three hours of talks.

Mrs Thatcher and Herr Kohl were joined by their Foreign Ministers, Francis Pym and Hans-Dietrich Genscher, and by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir Geoffrey Howe.

The Prime Minister afterwards conveyed the impression of not being unhappy about the course the steel talks had taken. Herr Kohl made no mention of the subject in his final declaration.

It was noted attentively in London that Helmut Kohl claimed to represent a post-war German generation that from its youth on had tried hard to bring about a united Europe.

Such deep-seated European idealism

Continued on page 5

IN THIS ISSUE	
Foreign Affairs	Page 2
Unity of Solidarity	
Security conference	
Pressure under pressure	
German Affairs	Page 4
Copy East Berlin gets its	
Agenda all wrong	
Press	Page 7
Endoring the boardrooms	
Follow in the footsteps	
Baguette	
Controversy over scheme	Page 8
Pressure reliance on	
Conventional weapons	

■ WORLD AFFAIRS

Banning of Solidarity puts security conference process under pressure

The West has laid down three conditions for a return to normal in ties with Poland: the end of martial law, the release of detainees and the resumption of talks with Solidarity.

Has it possibly set a trap in which it itself will be ensnared?

Martial law may one day be ended. The last detainees, even Lech Walesa, may be released. But the dialogue between Church, state and Solidarity is unlikely to be resumed now the trade union has been banned.

So the United States wants to step up pressure on Poland when the CSCE review conference reopens in Madrid in November.

The Europeans want to salvage the conference and with it detente, about which the Reagan administration is extremely sceptical.

Thus the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe has emerged as a touchstone of Western unity.

Last autumn the prospects of agreement in Madrid were good, with the non-aligned and neutral countries having submitted a compromise proposal for the final document.

Given a few improvements this proposal seemed to provide a sound basis for understanding between East and West.

Substantial results seemed likely, including progress in all CSCE policy sectors, on economic, cultural and humanitarian issues.

Important features relating to the proposed Conference on Disarmament in Europe had also been formulated: confidence-building measures designed to prevent surprise attacks.

But the imposition of martial law in Poland last December put paid to these prospects for the time being.

Nothing came of the next round of negotiations. When the conference was resumed in February the United States refused to negotiate at all.

Poland must first fulfil the West's three demands, which were interpreted much more strictly in Washington than in European capitals.

After five weeks of talks and an arid debate on Poland in Madrid the conference was adjourned again, this time for nine months.

It was hoped the situation would grow less tense during this period, after which talks were to be resumed without strings with a view to bringing them to a successful conclusion without delay.

The compromise proposal submitted by the non-aligned and neutral countries was to continue as the basis for discussion.

This target could probably be reached fast. Most of the issues at stake were dealt with last year and framed in writing ready for approval.

All the West still wanted to negotiate was a few extra improvements in the exchange of information, a stronger commitment to human rights and greater detail on the terms of reference of disarmament conference decisions.

Moscow and its allies have indicated readiness to compromise, but the ban on Solidarity is a fresh setback so serious that it could mean the end of the CSCE process once and for all.

Thirty-three European states are already a thorn in the flesh of the East-

West policy of pressure and punishment drawn up by Mr Reagan's aides.

They particularly upset the applicability of disarmament and arms control talks America would for the time being prefer to hold bilaterally with Russia, concentrating on strategic intermediate-range and intercontinental ballistic missiles.

But the Europeans, including Nato members, non-aligned and neutral countries and even Moscow's allies, demand a say in the course of negotiations.

Western Europe in particular insists on the 1979 Nato resolution to combine disarmament talks combined with the missile modernisation option being fulfilled over the entire weapons range.

This is where the Conference on Disarmament in Europe comes in. The most telling argument in favour of reaching agreement in Madrid is that if the conference were to fail or be postponed indefinitely, the credibility of US negotiations in Europe would be bound to be hit hard.

This particular chicken would come home to roost in autumn 1983 when missile modernisation appeared on the Nato agenda, it is argued.

Bonn, especially the new Bonn government, has every good reason to take up cudgels on behalf of European interests.

The steel war between Europe and America has finally ended. Brussels and Washington have signed an agreement.

But the deal was marked by a loss of credit by Bonn because of the way it held out until the very last minute in an effort to gain the maximum advantage for German steel manufacturers.

It was the first time that the new Bonn government has had a real clash with the other EEC countries.

No-one could expect Bonn to have everything worked out and running smoothly yet. The old government had no clear ideas on Europe; the new one seems to have none either.

The steel dispute between Europe and America presents an opportunity of analysing a number of Bonn's weaker points.

For fundamental reasons of security policy there was keen interest in reaching agreement on steel to settle at least one of the many disputes between the two.

For once it was not the Reagan administration that was to blame for the difficulties encountered by British, Belgian, French and Italian steel exporters in particular.

The US steel industry merely made use of existing American legislation to ward off some of its competitors.

Bonn's security policy interests ran counter to the Lambdorff doctrine of preventing wherever possible any hindrance to free trade.

What was more, steelmakers on the Rhine and in the Ruhr felt they were sitting pretty, having managed without government subsidies so far and thus not being liable to punitive US government levies.

Did Bonn really need to bludgeon the other EEC countries into allowing Germany an additional outlet of 34,000 tons of steel for two years?

The Final Act at Helsinki, sealing the Helsinki accords, is a crucial document on East-West relations as an evolutionary process of cooperation and normalisation.

It opens up the long-term prospect of a peace order in Europe that is, for people in the two German states, the sole prospect so far apparent of a solution to the German Question.

The Helsinki accords make few demands on the West that it does not already meet. The East has much more ground to make good.

Europe has other reasons for not wanting to see the CSCE process founder on endless debates about Poland. From its viewpoint the Helsinki process is:

- an almost inexhaustible political and diplomatic means of pressuring the East to make changes and to establish more evenly balanced relations;
- the first multilateral attempt to arrive, via a wide-ranging agenda, at practical cooperation over and beyond the borders of political systems;
- the basis, as acknowledged by the East, of America's and Canada's right to a say in European affairs;
- a means of including in European cooperation countries that have no other negotiation platform and back the West on all fundamental issues;
- and an encouragement for reform

Peace breaks out in The Steel War

The result was an inappropriately snooty attitude toward the British, Belgians, French and Italians along the lines of "they have only themselves to blame for the US levies."

It was inappropriate because jobs can only be saved by government subsidies in the Saar, on the payroll of the future Ruhrstahl AG and at the once-proud engineering giant AEG.

But subsidies will only be permitted providing the EEC Commission gives approval.

In other EEC countries there are growing suspicions that the Germans plan to use their economic supremacy to mow down all the weaker members of the Common Market.

Bonn's paramount interest in the European Community must be to keep open the huge customs union of EEC and EFTA countries.

Western Europe accounts for more than half Germany's export business, and Bonn's European policy ought to be geared to showing maximum consideration for its partners in Europe.

It is a market threatened. The latest French economic measures, for instance, are a desperate bid to boost exports and set the balance of payments right.

Did Bonn really need to bludgeon the other EEC countries into allowing Germany an additional outlet of 34,000 tons of steel for two years?

advocates in Eastern Europe who reliably base their arguments on the Helsinki accords.

Only the Helsinki Final Act, which contains voluntary commitments by all parties, can be added to justify massive intervention in a country's domestic affairs as was undertaken in Poland last year.

If the CSCE accords were to be affirmed and further developed, claim would be further underpinned and would help to improve the atmosphere of East-West relations, thereby reinforcing the position of the Polish people.

If they were to be written off, the vict Union would be given carte blanche for uncompromising application of the Brezhnev Doctrine throughout the sphere of influence.

The 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia was based on Brezhnev Doctrine.

Yet the United States regards the CSCE process as part of a failed policy and fails to appreciate its dynamic force and the changes it has already brought about.

In the Reagan administration's legislation under Article 50 of the Helsinki process is merely a bid to Moscow to have the status quo in Europe acknowledged as final and binding.

This bid failed in the negotiations leading up to the August 1975 Helsinki conference, and no-one need keep repeating that the Helsinki process is a dead letter.

What is more, there is no reason why the West should forgo putting its effective political instrument as the CSCE process to good use.

Wolf J. Meckel
(General-Anzeiger Bonn, 31 October 1982)

Or was it just behaving like the proverbial china shop?

The Bonn government is keen to press toward a European Union in order to keep the EEC market in being.

It would be splendid if the Colombo plan were to be accepted the right of veto to be restricted in the Council of Ministers, thereby making swifter EEC decisions possible.

But how can this be reconciled with Bonn's Economic Affairs Minister insisting on unanimity should some members be envisaged to the steel agreement with the United States?

If policy on Europe is to be handled by a single Commissioner.

There used to be one, Hans-Joachim Wilschewski, Minister of State at the Foreign Office, who was coordinating European policy.

If Chancellor Kohl really wants to achieve in the EEC what he claims he would have to give his Ministers more power.

Continued on page 3

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HOME AFFAIRS

Houses of parliament: link not always an easy one

The Federal government and the upper house were at each other's throats throughout the 13 years of the CDU/CSU and FDP coalition in Bonn.

Democrats in the Bonn government constantly criticised the CDU majority in the Bundesrat. The upper house obstructed the Bundestag's legislative work and party political ambitions.

Whenever state elections were held Social Democrats liked to suggest that a two-thirds majority of the members in the Bundesrat would be a danger to the Social-Liberal coalition.

The conservatives made no bones about these 13 years about the fact that the states took in shaping the legislation under Article 50 of the Basic Law.

Constitution was not restricted to state interests but was also governed by party-political considerations.

The FDP was often cunning — especially in economic policy — hoping for support whenever it was on the verge of being ousted by the SPD coalition.

Any event, lawmaking in almost all important sectors was an extremely difficult business.

Through the Bundesrat rarely flatted down bills in which it had a say as those governing extremists in justice posts, VAT increases and numerous objections) it sent them to a mediating committee and thus about far-reaching amendments.

Any laws thus became useless work. As a result, some people derided the all-party government due to the conservatives' enormous influence.

The new CDU/CSU and FDP coalition came to power in Bonn, the states in the Bundestag and the Bundestag are of the same political complexion.

This now mean a complete halting of the two houses of parliament?

It is most unlikely, though natural, that the legislative work has become easier — in matters that are seen primarily in a party-political light.

The first public exchange of views between the Bundesrat and the Bonn government when Chancellor Helmut Kohl addressed the Bundesrat and CSU Franz Josef Strauss the Bundes-

rat. There is little general public appreciation of such issues: what is far more important to the man in the street is that the FDP changed its coalition partner over his head.

The Free Democrats clearly breached their 1980 campaign promise that "voting for the FDP guarantees Schmidt's continued chancellorship."

All parties in the Bundestag now agree that elections should be held as soon as possible. But that constitutional difficulty. The government must remain in office until the end of the term.

The Constitution leaves no doubt that this was the intention of its designers. When they drafted it, they had in mind what happened in the Weimar Republic.

There are constitutional obstacles barring all roads out of the political dilemma that the government has delib-

Erich Hauser
(Frankfurter Rundschau, 23 October 1982)

relationship between Bonn and the states will not be easy now because they call for a two-thirds majority in both houses; and it will prove very difficult to reach the necessary agreements between CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP.

The old Bonn government made the mistake of presenting bills to the Bundesrat in the hope that the upper house would either be swayed by "convincing solutions" or that it would be branded as the culprit if it rejected the bill.

The CDU and CSU-governed states have warned Kohl not to confront them with fails accomplis.

To prevent unnecessary and harmful disputes, the states says, Kohl should ascertain their attitude towards legislative projects in good time — and good time means before the cabinet has decided.

In any event it is hard to imagine that Kohl could make decisions on his own considering such people as Strauss, Albrecht and Späth.

The states hold that the gesture Kohl made by offering State Minister Friedrich Vogel as a liaison is not enough to improve the atmosphere.

Franz Josef Strauss for one would have preferred a genuine "Bundesrat minister" while Ernst Albrecht has called for an informal committee within the conservative parties made up of federal and state politicians. The function of the committee would be to discuss important legislation before it is tabled.

Such a committee — if used intensively — would, however, raise even more constitutional reservations than were raised by the activities of the mediating committees.

If this were to be implemented, the balance between Bonn and the Länder would be abolished in favour of party-political meetings. And this, in turn, would fuel allegations of a "CDU nation".

Heinz-Joachim Meider
(Kölnischer Stadt-Anzeiger, 20 October 1982)

Constitutional hurdle to election plan

Proposals to hold a general election on March 6 have run into a constitutional hurdle: there is no provision for the government to go to the country before the end of the legislative term — that is, 1984.

The new Bonn government has no shortage of problems: almost 2m unemployed, a record deficit and no sign of an economic upswing.

So the discussion over the finer procedural points that surround the proposed election seems by comparison a somewhat remote matter.

There is little general public appreciation of such issues: what is far more important to the man in the street is that the FDP changed its coalition partner over his head.

The Free Democrats clearly breached their 1980 campaign promise that "voting for the FDP guarantees Schmidt's continued chancellorship."

All parties in the Bundestag now agree that elections should be held as soon as possible. But that constitutional difficulty. The government must remain in office until the end of the term.

The Constitution leaves no doubt that this was the intention of its designers. When they drafted it, they had in mind what happened in the Weimar Republic.

There are constitutional obstacles barring all roads out of the political dilemma that the government has delib-

erately brought upon itself through its promise to hold new elections.

There are a number of escape routes under consideration. One would be to amend the Constitution to enable parliament to dissolve itself. This approach is not new. It has already been suggested by a constitutional fact-finding committee.

Yet there are many reservations against it. It would be the first time that MPs would have to decide on a constitutional amendment in great haste. The best thing would be to discuss a possible amendment and take plenty of time over it after the elections.

Another way of achieving the dissolution of parliament and new elections would be the Chancellor's resignation under Article 63 of the Constitution. But this would put a heavy strain on the Constitution.

The scenario in such a case would roughly be: the Chancellor resigns. The president would have to propose a new candidate for the office to the Bundesrat in the full knowledge that the majorities being what they are, Parliament does not want to elect a new Chancellor.

If — as must be expected — the proposed candidate cannot muster the necessary majority, the Bundestag would have two weeks in which to propose any number of candidates on which it

Continued on page 15

Schmidt delays decision on his future

Former Chancellor Schmidt is hedging about whether to become the SPD leader in the Bundestag. Nor has he agreed to run to regain the chancellorship in the election scheduled for March.

The main reason reason for not making a decision is probably because he realises that his own politics are not the same as a large section of the party.

Close advisers have also warned him against letting himself in for something that might wear him down.

But Schmidt seems deeply aware that the era of social-liberal coalition is irrevocably over. He has often mentioned this.

An unsuccessful attempt to revive the coalition would have disastrous consequences for whoever was the driving force behind it.

Schmidt is now in the process of explaining his views of the SPD/FDP era and so is unlikely to want to risk a political adventure.

The ex-chancellor's frequent addresses at trade union meetings must be taken as evidence that he wants to show the course the SPD should steer in the future.

As Schmidt sees it, the Social Democrats should intensify their efforts for the working class, where the party has its roots.

Such an attitude would be meaningful only if seen as an attempt to spare the party a brusque brush-off, intimating that he would not stand for the chancellorship again because he is working on his political last will and testament.

Schmidt mentioned recently more or less in passing what issues he would be dealing with in his memoirs. And anybody who does this is unlikely to contemplate returning to major politics.

Moreover, Schmidt seems to realise that his role as the SPD's locomotive was closely linked to his position as Chancellor.

But by far the most important reason for the hedging is probably the fact that his own political course differs from large part of his party.

While SPD Chairman Willy Brandt spearheads those in the party who want to rally Green (anti-nuke/environmentalist/peace movement) voters, Schmidt has never made any bones about his rejection of such a strategy. The Greens are "no discussion partners," he says.

So he finds it difficult to be the candidate of a party that has not yet fixed its position on major domestic affairs issues.

There is a vast chasm between Schmidt and the Greens, who oppose the double NATO decision on which the ex-chancellor would have to make concessions should the "left of the CDU/CSU-coalition" favoured by Brandt materialise.

Schmidt, who is proud of being the engineer of the NATO decision, would stake his credibility if he stood for the chancellorship under these circumstances.

It is for these reasons that he will politely but firmly turn down his party's wish.

Karl Hugo Pruys
(Bremer Nachrichten, 20 October 1982)

INTRA-GERMAN AFFAIRS

Relations with GDR
'stepped-up in priority'

Relations between the Federal Republic and the GDR are to get a higher priority than under the Schmidt government, says the new Minister for Intra-German Affairs, Rainer Barzel.

The Schmidt government, he said, was only interested in bilateral relations between the states themselves. The new government wants "better relations for Germany and the Germans." And the GDR would have to get used to it.

This change in status had been reflected in a change in seating order both in Cabinet and in the Bundestag.

Herr Barzel said that despite the new emphasis, the German issue would be handled calmly and not aggressively.

The government had no intention of "engaging in a semantic dispute on the question whether there are two states, two German states or two states in Germany."

Barzel himself uses all these terms and is quite uninhibited in speaking of his "visit to East Berlin" or his intention to tour the region along the "zone border."

He says that it is a mere exercise in polemics to object to such terminology or indeed to depict it as proof of "all-German dreams."

Barzel places particular emphasis on the assurance in Chancellor Kohl's state-of-the-nation address to the Bundestag when he said that the new government will abide by all obligations towards the GDR entered into by the previous government.

This meant that all agreements with

East Berlin would remain valid, including the agreement on the interest-free overdraft facility for intra-German trade.

The Minister hoped that East Berlin would regard this as a "signal."

There was now a circumspect government in Bonn, a government that knew what it was doing, and that that included relations between the two German states.

Asked about the possibility of further comprehensive and long-term agreements with the GDR — Chancellor Kohl expressed an interest in such agreements in his Bundestag address — Barzel pointed to the cultural agreement and cultural exchange.

"There are still loose ends that we want to tie up," he said, referring to the talks former Chancellor Minister Wischniewski held in East Berlin in mid-September.

Barzel evidently thinks of culture in broader terms than those applied by East Germany. He hopes above all to make cultivation of the German language an area of common interest.

He rejects all GDR attempts to "raise issues that stand no chance of being settled."

He sees little scope for a settlement of the border dispute. The GDR wants it in the middle of the Elbe River instead of on the river's north-east bank. This can be taken as a flat rejection of East German demands.

There is also no chance of reaching a citizenship arrangement as wanted by

East Berlin because this would violate the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Another issue that Barzel considers non-negotiable is the closure of the Salzgrütter office for the investigation of crimes arising from the division of the country. This, he said, was an internal matter of the state justice departments, primarily Lower Saxony's.

The upgrading of the permanent missions of the two German states in Bonn and East Berlin to the status of embassies would also not be considered.

He considers it more useful to act on previous arrangements, for instance, agreements on the work of journalists.


If further negotiations are to take place, they should deal with the abnormal travel conditions between the Federal Republic and the GDR.

Asked about the claim of the East Berlin newspaper *Neues Deutschland* that — referring to the quid pro quo principle — "the GDR has so far done more than the Federal Republic of Germany," the Minister said he was at a loss to see what the paper could have meant.

He was not troubled by the narrowly defined authority of his Ministry regarding *Deutschlandpolitik* resulting from the fact that the permanent mission to East Berlin is answerable directly to the Chancellery and controlled from there.

Since East Berlin might assume that he is too "dynamic," he suspects that the GDR's permanent mission in Bonn will shirk contacts with the Intra-German Affairs Ministry, dealing instead with other Ministries, especially that of Economic Affairs, with which it has always had close contacts.

The GDR, he said, need not fear that there will by any change regarding authorities and procedures because that



Rainer Barzel... no semantic dispute

would be irreconcilable with the government's firm determination not to do anything that will irritate East Berlin.

He said he would "take a close look at everything and then tackle it with the necessary even-handedness."

He expects that the national election next spring will mean additional work for his Ministry because the Chancellery and its State Minister Jennings, in charge of the permanent mission to East Berlin, will be overburdened with other work.

As to the envisaged 6 March elections, Barzel said that this was stressing that "we are no frauds."

He sees it as his personal mission to see by far the largest nationality the election date was mentioned in Chancellor Kohl's Bundestag address.

Ernst-Otto Machens

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 21 October 1982)

MIGRANTS

Turkish papers accuse 'Ugly Germans'
over hostility towards foreigners

Germans visiting Turkey are often attacked about the German dislike of migrants. It crops up in almost every conversation.

Turkish newspapers tell about the Germans. The attitude is aggressive and violent.

The Turks, the tourists are told, once the Germans in respect. They admire their efficiency, their correctness in their economic status.

Permanent workers signed on in Turkey under the pressure on a booming German economy were a further link between the two countries.

Now "Turks out!" slogans were appearing more frequently everywhere in Cologne, Essen, Munich and Frankfurt.

The injured Turkish pride and put a burden on traditionally cordial relations between Germany and Turkey.

Discussions with private people in Istanbul and eastern Anatolia, which is made courteously, implore the Turkish government to stop the "Foreigners Out!" campaign.

Newspapers fears are voiced that the Bonn government will further the "Foreigners Out!" campaign. Comment colours objectivity. The Turks are evidently not too clear about the facts.

They are reluctant to appreciate that the 46 million foreigners in the Federal Republic of Germany are well ahead of the Yugoslavs, Italians, Greeks and Spaniards. There are not just the 600,000 Turkish migrants, of whom 14 per cent are now employed and drawing DM120m a year in benefits.

There are their families too, another 500,000 or so. And despite the ban on enrolment and visa requirements, more are bound to keep coming, especially children.

There are also an estimated 200,000 visas. So there are about 1.8m Turkish residents in West Germany.

Problems arise because the made in his speech in Gera in October 1980: recognition of GDR citizenship, upgrading of the permanent mission to East Berlin, settlement of the Elbe border issue and dissolution of the State Office for the investigation of crimes.

But the Kohl government is unwilling to concede on issues on which Schmidt refused to give in.

With it all, there is no need to doubt intra-German relations. The GDR is at least as dependent on the Federal Republic of Germany as the Federal Republic is on the GDR.

There are the trade relations, the many monetary transfers and foreign exchange earnings resulting from travel to the GDR — all of which are now more sorely needed than before.

Bonn will have to take into consideration that the GDR leadership is deeply insecure — primarily due to many new formulations in Bonn and East German misinterpretations.

If Bonn makes a point of explaining what its course really is, the GDR leadership is bound to adapt to the realities.

Joachim Nawroth
(Die Welt, 21 October 1982)

no way, it is stressed, in which it can cope with this population explosion.

Official statistics admit to 15 per cent unemployment, so expansion, or in other words migration to Western Europe in general and West Germany in particular, seems the only way out.

For Turkey the problem of Turkish workers returning home, urgent though it might be, seems the least of its difficulties.

In a TV interview before his government policy statement to the Bundestag Helmut Kohl, the Bonn Chancellor, emphasised how pressing the Turkish problem was felt to be in Germany.

Here, now and fast, he said, sensible and socially just measures must be taken to get Turks to return home and reduce the number living in the Federal Republic.

Traditional friendship with Turkey must not, he added, be jeopardised, adding a few words of appreciation of Turkish culture.

Herr Kohl's first words on the subject were noted in Ankara with keen interest. In an initial conciliatory reply the Turkish Labour Minister appealed to Bonn to arrange for migrant workers to return home without coercion and with suitable support.

Suitable support as Germany sees it is mainly a matter of creating sound jobs for returnees to enable them to

make use back home of the skills they have learnt in Germany.

For some time there have been experiments with associations set up to use Turkish savings in Germany to launch companies in Turkey.

Experts reckon Turkish workers in Germany have about DM10bn to DM15bn on deposit at German banks alone, so there is no lack of capital that might be invested.

The idea of workers' societies productively using their accumulated savings to invest and reintegrate back home is a most interesting one, at least on paper.

In practice Turkey has a shortage of managers and skilled workers. It lacks the managerial skills needed to ensure the survival of new small-, medium-scale and craft firms.

So there is less incentive to return home when you know the old country lacks the know-how to ensure long-term employment.

Too many migrant workers invest the money they save in Germany in land, companies and farms in Turkey but prefer themselves to stay on in Germany.

That can hardly be a sound reason for staying in Germany from the German point of view.

Relations between the two countries are nowadays mainly a matter of migrant workers. Romantic, sentimental

Spanish priest
tells of 'the
social outcasts'

tioned included the motor industry and dustmen in many towns and cities.

The Christian Democrats wanted to see integration, but it would only be possible if the number of foreign residents was not allowed to increase uncontrolled.

Government policy was to retain the ban on hiring foreign workers from non-EEC countries. It was essential to do so in the interest of foreign residents themselves.

"What use would it be to them," he asked, "if coming to the Federal Republic meant no more than certain unemployment?"

He spoke out in favour of regulations governing members of foreign workers' families entitled to join husbands, wives or parents in Germany.

This was a controversial issue at the Bonn conference, but he defended current policy as follows: "Out of a sense of responsibility toward foreign children I feel an age limit beyond which children may not be allowed to join their parents in Germany is sensible and necessary."

"It is all very well to say that foreign residents ought to be allowed to bring 14- to 15-year-old children with them."

"But at that age they are no longer going to be able to bridge the gap. Children who join their parents too late are being deprived of their prospects for life and the future."

This was particularly true with unem-

recollections of the past are not enough to gloss over present problems.

Both sides must face the facts and set illusions aside. Scepticism, criticism and a constructive outlook are the only way to sustain the substance of relations.

We must appreciate in the West that no matter how keen the Turks are to join the West they remain Asians. Anatolia extends way into the Near and Middle East.

This undeniable fact presents an opportunity of more intensive cooperation, especially in the military sector, with Turkey as a partner.

Turkey must be seen both as a bulwark against expansion south by the Soviet Union and as a Western bridge to the Middle East and Central Asia.

Wolfgang Höpker

(Rheinischer Merkur/Christ und Welt, 22 October 1982)

Downing Street

Continued from page 1
is seldom encountered in the British capital.

European problems, especially Britain's continued call for a reduction in its financial contribution to the Common Market's kitty, were sure to be a main feature of the Bonn consultations between the two governments.

Mrs Thatcher will be as tough a negotiator on this point as she has been in the past with Helmut Schmidt.

She said she was going to visit Berlin after her talks in Bonn. She would be accompanied by Chancellor Kohl.

Fritz Wirth

(Die Welt, 21 October 1982)

ployment so high in Germany at present.

But foreign residents who want to stay in Germany must integrate. That makes heavy demands on both them and the Germans.

Foreign residents must be expected to show understanding for political, social and cultural conditions in their host country.

In particular, they must acknowledge the principle of constitutional government and Western democracy.

"The Koran is not the constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany," Herr Gelsler said. "Basic Law is the constitution."

Germans, he said, must accept foreigners as being different. Coexistence of customs and cultures must be seen not as a nuisance but as a prospect of enrichment and variety.

Political mistakes were to blame for the problem of foreign residents having assumed such proportions, said Josef Stigl, head of the Federal Labour Office, Nuremberg.

Bonn ought to have reached agreement with migrant workers' native countries on how families were to be reunited. Yet from the start it had been a one-way traffic, with families being reunited in Germany only.

The government's failure to take action at the right time was finally responsible for the problems Turkish women faced in looking for jobs and Turkish youngsters in looking for an apprenticeship.

Members of the family were by no means always brought to Germany merely in order to reunite families, Herr Stigl said.

In many cases children were brought back to Germany by their fathers to earn money.

Peter Matthes

(Kleiner Nachrichten, 21 October 1982)

Jumpy East Berlin gets its
propaganda all wrong

An article in the East Berlin party newspaper, *Neues Deutschland*, the day after Bonn Chancellor Helmut Kohl had delivered his policy speech shows how the change of government has caused some jumpiness in the GDR.

The article was published under the byline of the paper's Bonn correspondent, Werner Otto, but it is clear that it was inspired from high places in East Berlin.

It is a long time since *Neues Deutschland* has put its comments so crudely: it claimed that Kohl wanted a more Atlantic than European orientation. But it did not say that Kohl had also said he was "seeking new roads towards European unity."

The paper misquoted Kohl as saying: "The alliance with the USA is the essence of German statecraft." What Kohl said was: "The alliance is the essence..." He was, of course, referring to the North Atlantic alliance and made no reference to the USA in that context.

The *Deutschlandpolitik* part of the Chancellor's address was also falsified.

The article claimed that Kohl did not speak of the two German states but resorted to such terms as "Germany as a whole." What Kohl said was that the cooperation of "German states" must be improved. The term "Germany as a whole" was only used in connection with Allied rights dating back to the post-war era.

After all, the Soviet troops in East Germany still call themselves "Group of Soviet Armed Forces in Germany" and maintain liaison missions at the staffs of the Western allies.

Neues Deutschland also said that Kohl had spoken of the borders of 1937. Not a word of this is true.

The assessment of the facts is as malicious as their depiction: "Many people will ask themselves what can be expected of a country whose government is anxious to have Pershing 2 missiles stationed on its soil — something the majority of the citizens reject — and pursues pan-German ambitions."

Contrary to the Basic Treaty, the paper wrote, Kohl "wantonly" spoke of German unity and the fact that the German question was open.

Yet that very Basic Treaty (and its addenda) state that different views on the nationhood issue exist and that the citizenship issue remains unresolved, stating the Federal Republic of Germany's objective as "to work towards a condition of peace in Europe in which the German people can re-establish their unity in free self-determination."

Honecker himself said once that when socialism knocks on the Federal Republic of Germany's door the question of reunification will have to be totally rephrased.

The day after *Neues Deutschland's* commentary, Honecker tried to pour oil on troubled waters. While visiting Cyprus, he gave an interview consisting of

one question and one answer. He said he considered it too early to make a comprehensive statement because he still had to study the full text of the state-of-the-nation address.

This means that the newspaper's commentary was premature. But even Honecker was deceived by the false quote, "alliance with the USA" as the essence of German statecraft. What bothered him, however, was above all the term "German statecraft."

He said the Chancellor could only speak for the Federal Republic of Germany, but that two sovereign and independent German states had emerged from the ashes of the Second World War.

The GDR leadership seems to find it hard to believe that the new Bonn government simply wants to continue its *Deutschlandpolitik* where the previous *Deutschlandpolitik* stopped.

East Berlin is suspicious of the word "continuity" because it feels that the Kohl government will be tougher in negotiations and will be more insistent in such demands as the reduction of the compulsory exchange of money for visitors from the West.

Conservative West German politicians have for years had contacts with

No quick ways of getting rid of the danger points





Growth forecasts for next year differ slightly. The advisory council report anticipates a growth rate of one per cent - with luck. It expects an improvement

Bundesbank cuts the cost of money by 1 per cent

The desire for cheap money is of course legitimate. Lower interest rates are a major element in industry's decision to invest, though there are other

How the Federal Republic rates

Growth	Prices	Unemployment	National debt
Economic growth 1982 (% est.)	Increase 1982 1st half, (%)	% 1982, 1st half	1981, % of GNP
Japan +2	Japan +2.6	Japan 2.3	France* 16
Italy +1.5	Fed Rep. Germ +5.6	Fed Rep Germany 5.8	Fed Rep Germany 34
France +1	USA +7.2	France 8.4	Japan 46
Britain +1	Britain +10.2	USA 8.9	USA 47
Fed Rep Germany 0	France +13.9	Italy 9.1	Italy 49
USA -1.5	Italy +16.6	Britain 12.7	Britain 59

The reduced use of production capa-

Federal Republic of Germany, Switzerland, Austria and, perhaps, also Britain and Holland.

Continued on page 7

Abandoning the boardrooms to follow in the footsteps of Gauguin

likely to achieve a similar place in history, most of them have laudable reasons for the change.

If the central bank went along with Schmidt's demand, the consequences

Claus Dertinger
(Die Welt, 20 October 1988)

Women at the top show their paces

Jutta W. Thomasius
(Frankfurter Neue Presse, 16 October 1998)

Interest rates reduced

Schmidt's demand, the consequence

ed October won't be the last one.
Claus Dertinger
(Die Welt, 20 October 1988)

economic cart out of the mire.
Jutta W. Thomasius
(Frankfurter Neue Presse, 16 October 1998)

■ NATO

Controversy over scheme to increase reliance on conventional weapons

Now at Nato has become public. It involves an alleged change of strategy by the organisation's American commanding officer General Bernard W. Rogers.

European Nato officials, say General Rogers has put the emphasis on building up conventional forces. These are to be equipped with new, electronically guided missiles designed to knock out a second wave of attacking Warsaw Pact forces in their assembly areas.

The officials don't mention General Rogers by name, but they clearly mean him. They say his views will alter the nuclear threshold. He has also underestimated the cost of the changes.

General Rogers has rejected the accusations. He is upset about them. He feels he has been misunderstood and unfairly accused on having failed to consult the appropriate Nato bodies.

His concept, he says, was submitted to the Nato military committee on 30 October 1981 as part of the armed forces proposals.

On 8 December 1981 it was referred to the defence planning committee at a meeting attended by Ministers, and on 19 May 1982 it was dealt with by high-ranking military officers from Nato countries at the Shapex conference.

The governments of member-countries are also said to have been informed. His strategic ideas were included in the armed forces targets laid down in spring 1982.

Nato officials close to General Rogers say it is wrong to talk of a new strategy. The general sees his proposals in a wider context and regards them as an intensification of the existing flexible response strategy.

They recall that the forward defence concept is a German idea. Nato strategy as agreed leaves room for flexibility.

General Haig, who was General Rogers' predecessor at the military helm of Nato, likewise sought to strengthen the pact's conventional forces.

This is felt to be essential because of changes that have occurred in the triad of Nato defence options, consisting of strategic, tactical and conventional forces.

In this deterrent triad strategic and intermediate-range nuclear systems have been improved, while conventional forces have been neglected.

As a result, the balance of the triad is in jeopardy.

General Rogers ordered a review of existing conventional capacity on taking over as Nato chief. It was to bear in mind the requirements of existing strategy and the newly-developed Soviet capability.

The review revealed that conventional forces were inadequate. This inadequacy would lead to the nuclear threshold being shifted lower in the event of hostilities.

He initially concentrated on improving the serviceability of existing forces. On further consideration conditions were laid down for ensuring that the nuclear threshold was held higher.

One concept entailed using the latest electronic options to identify Warsaw Pact assembly areas and destroy second-echelon units and tanks there.



This strategy would leave the aggressor with the option of a first nuclear strike, whereas Nato's nuclear capacity would remain in reserve as a last option.

General Rogers' ideas have now been discussed at Nato headquarters in Brussels and in Nato's military committee, and it was clear that European Nato countries were sceptical.

They object to any idea of Nato strategy requiring new features and would prefer to avoid the term "new strategy," which has been used by the media since General Rogers' official pronouncements.

The Europeans point out that they have always actively supported the maintenance and improvement of conventional armed forces.

The political aim of such endeavours is to keep the nuclear threshold as high as possible yet to maintain an effective deterrent by both conventional and nuclear means.

Criticism is also levelled at announcements that new weapons are on the way. While it is accepted that such weapons will be an invaluable reinforcement for conventional purposes, they cannot for the time being take the place of theatre nuclear weapons in their deterrent effect.

They will certainly be unable to do so, the argument runs, for as long as the Geneva talks have failed to achieve results.

It is agreed in Nato that nuclear weapons are only to be used to influence the political intentions of an aggressor. So the introduction of new weapons technology would only indirectly influence the nuclear threshold.

Doubts are also cast on General Rogers' assertion that the desired improvement in conventional forces could be brought about by boosting member-countries' military spending by four per cent a year in real terms until the end of the decade.

In 1977 Nato agreed to an increase in defence spending in the region of three per cent per annum in real terms.

This was not even enough to meet all obligations arising from the long-term defence programme.

There were no findings yet available

Atlantic Council faces up to tough question of finance

The traditional winter session of the Atlantic Council, to be held in Brussels early in December, looks like being a trial of strength for Nato.

The North Atlantic pact's 16 Defence Ministers, and arguably even more so the 16 Foreign Ministers, face what seems to be a task that virtually defies solution.

Their aim is to call a halt to the anti-nuclear weapons movement on both sides of the Atlantic by boosting non-nuclear, conventional armament.

This seems sure to mean extra costs amounting between one and one and a half per cent of current defence spending, or between \$2.5bn and \$4.3bn, and it would be good value at the price.

This figure, which has been going the rounds at Nato, is the total that would be shared by all member-countries. But the prospects are poor.

In the United States there are new stories about once a week of reports concluding that the accumulated debt of the US Federal government is expected to reach \$1,000bn by 1985 or so.

The inference is that from 1984 America is going to have to make swingeing cuts in defence spending.

The next link in the chain of argument is an analysis of defence costs, about half of which go toward safeguarding Europe by virtue of America's Nato commitments.

If America can no longer afford to do so, it is argued, US policy will just have to be changed, and why not withdraw from Europe indeed when the Euro-

peans are not doing enough for their own security?

No-one is more determinedly opposed to such ideas than General Bernard W. Rogers, the Nato C-in-C, but he is known no longer to be on the same wavelength as Defence Secretary Weinberger.

In Washington Mr Reagan's Californian aides are gaining greater influence, and they see the United States not just as an Atlantic, European power but half as a Pacific, Asian one.

This is a dangerous trend from the viewpoint of European security. What is needed is a full-scale campaign to brief US public opinion on Europe's defence contribution.

Over the past decade US defence spending has declined in net terms, after inflation adjustment, by 1.8 per cent per annum. Europe's defence spending has increased.

What is more, clarity must be established on what has been termed Nato's new strategy.

To draw level with the Warsaw Pact in conventional terms Nato would need to embark on a full-scale arms build-up, but in the past this has been felt to be too expensive.

So in the event of a Warsaw Pact attack the West could not afford to rule out a nuclear response.

Moscow has formally proposed renouncing the first use of nuclear weapons, but the West cannot consider doing so until conventional parity has been restored.

Bids to strike a balance have been in progress to no avail for 10 years at the

on how much money was still being spent but the signs were that a four-per-cent increase would at best be just enough to meet commitments envisaged.

That is, it might possibly be enough always assuming a four-per-cent increase in defence spending was feasible.

No information was available at the cost of the new weapons, which would not be available before 1990. It would be better not to give rise to unrealistic hopes.

Given the Nato countries' economic and financial situation calls for an increase in defence spending were particularly out of the question.

The anxiety voiced by European Nato countries about the new strategy must to a large extent be seen in connection with the impression it makes in public, especially on the side.

They fear the credibility of the current deterrent doctrine might be damaged if high-ranking Nato officials were to issue statements that had not been checked with other member-countries.

Nato must always convey a unified impression, which is why they suggest it would be better not to introduce further features into the special public strategy debate.

They regret that it was ever given a name, and although General Rogers clearly meant, his name is not mentioned.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 18 October 1982)

Vienna MBFR troop cut talks in October Europe.

Nato naturally stands very much in the way of the East bloc helping in this dilemma, although if Moscow only ready to compromise at Vienna West could forgo conventional modernisation.

But the Kremlin is likely to let the continue to stew in its own juice. Further hope that the campaign against nuclear armament in Nato will grow strong that nuclear arms to offset East's conventional superiority will be scrapped.

That could well upset the balance of military power in Europe once and for all.

So Nato's new strategy can only be combined convincing disarmament efforts with conventional modernisation despite shortage of funds.

Britain and France are going it alone so worried are they that joint efforts in this direction might fail to materialise.

France has decided to go ahead with the neutron bomb, albeit not this year, and in view of British and French clear spending neither can be expected to be able to afford extra conventional armaments.

The same is true of Nato countries such as Portugal, Spain, Greece, Turkey, Belgium and Denmark, all of which are virtually broke and unable to afford either.

Germany cannot possibly afford to bear the brunt of extra expenditure backed only by Holland and Norway let alone to make offset payments toward the cost of Nato to the United States.

The one and a half per cent of Nato defence spending initially mentioned amounts to roughly 25 per cent of Bonn's defence budget.

This is the trial of strength between the Bonn government in particular and the other European broad-

cast. (Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 19 October 1982)

COMMUNICATIONS

Dish antenna for satellite TV key to viewing choice of the future

In the mid-1980s Europe seems sure to have a much wider choice of satellite TV programmes. Using an inexpensive dish antenna we will all be able to receive directly programmes relayed by satellite.

programme to which viewers will be able to tune in should be relayed by Franco-German or satellites, and possibly by programmes experimentally produced by European Broadcasting Union.

But legal and political difficulties include issues of national sovereignty and unlimited advertising, which are minor matters. But no-one yet knows what products will be like.

EBU's third week of trial broadcasts has just been held. First Britain, then broadcast experimental programme.

time it was Austria's turn to receive hours of TV a day by satellite. The programmes were not readily available to anyone with a suitable antenna.

were decoded in Venice, where they were received from OTS, a disused hovering at an altitude of 36,000 ft at a position at 5°E.

the Prix Italia jury, consisting of leading officials and journalists, given a short and superficial look at conceptions of the media future.

was important source material for them who attended a conference on Satellites: Which Programmes? not been for the test programmes would have been limited to theoretical.

first week's transmissions, coming by Britain's Independent Broadcasting Authority, or commercial TV, who to emphasise the European character of the programmes by combining different features as possible.

the week's programmes put together of Italy dealt with a specific topic for a week.

Austria was keen to test multi-media live presentation, using teletext in a variety of languages, and graphic elements and testing services for a European public.

European news was relayed every hour, with a national news programme a day to show what important national news has in each country.

the end of November ARD, the German network, will produce the next EBU satellite TV trials. Will it original programmes as some of the satellite TV?

the satellite TV conference held in Bonn alongside the Prix Italia provided there were few pointers, apart from newscasts, to anything special European TV programmes.

satellite TV will not improve quality, says ARD programme director Dietrich Schwarzkopf. He and other European broadcast-

corporations are sceptical about the idea.

Their scepticism is by no means due merely to the prospect of competition from private operators.

"The French satellite may be in keeping with technical and economic requirements of gaining access to foreign markets," says M. Teyssier of French TV.

"But it is by no means in keeping with viewers' needs," he adds, sounding a clearly critical note.

Political and social considerations have been superseded of late by economic factors in pressing ahead with technical innovations and changing the media landscape.

This has not made it any easier to attempt meaningful programme planning, as experts in the Federal Republic well realise.

In Germany no more than a start has been made to cabling up the country to the new media. No-one has much idea what to do with the new capacity.

With agreement not yet having been reached on this point, satellite TV has made its appearance as yet another newcomer to the media market.

We now have three TV channels in Germany. Will we have 30 before long? What, in any case, is meant by European programmes?

Are they to be material specially but independently compiled by individual European broadcasting authorities?

Are they to be European-produced programmes with a European angle? Or are they to be programme exchanges featuring regional, autonomous culture?

Conference delegates wondered, but all that can be said with certainty is that technical developments are streets ahead of ideas on content and aesthetics.

But must this mean we are to face an



Bildschirmtext, the German videotex system. Viewers can dial information provided through the post office by organisations or individuals renting the system. (Photo: Kraufmann)

increasingly wide choice of identical programmes? A number of European countries, particularly Italy, are keen on the idea of satellite TV for Europe, but the men in charge still have a great many questions to answer.

What programmes do they envisage relaying by satellite and what concept of Europe or European do they favour?

Wolfgang Wörker

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 8 October 1982)

The dish of the future. The Berlin radio show featured this 3ft dish antenna for satellite radio and television. One day, this will be as common a domestic roof-top sight at the television aerial of today. (Photo: WEDO press)

Information through domestic TV — the age of videotex

Provided care is taken to avoid abuse, consumer associations in the Federal Republic of Germany are confident videotex services will make life easier.

Postmen as they trudge through the snow with their annual collection of Christmas and New Year cards may be consoled by the thought that season's greetings will soon be cheaper and less trouble to send by videotex.

Writing cards, sorting them and delivering them by hand would be much too expensive, quite apart from the waste of time.

The consumer viewpoint was framed in the wake of videotex trials, using 2,000 volunteer subscribers, in Berlin and Düsseldorf.

Everyone is convinced the service will be generally introduced next year, and by 1986 there are expected to be over a million subscribers. Details of the agreement are currently being drawn up to lay the legal groundwork for videotex technology.

Consumer associations are mainly concerned to ensure that customers' rights, for which so many a legal battle has long been fought, apply to videotex transactions just as they do to buying at the shop or on the doorstep.

General conditions of business must apply in full, especially the right to cancel an order made by the

armchair subscriber. Abuses must be prevented and, as the data protection commissioner put it, the principle of fair data processing must be observed.

By and large, consumer representatives feel retail traders are likely to have more trouble with videotex than customers.

Maybe videotex trading will finally bring about the demise of the Retail Trade (Hours of Business) Act. Videotex transactions can be carried out round the clock and not just from nine to five.

But the consumer must not be inundated with advertising, and advertising must be kept strictly separate from information.

This was one of the conclusions reached as a result of trials so far, but consumer representatives foresee a wide range of service facilities that could be provided in this way.

Consumer advice bureaux periodically compile price comparisons for various articles. These price lists have often been ordered by videotex subscribers in Berlin and Düsseldorf.

Banking is another service that could easily be supplied from computer to computer on the TV screen. Experts are far less worried than laymen by the possibility of computer crime in this context.

There are said to be three safety factors that will rule out improper access to someone else's bank account.

First, every customer has his own code number in addition to his personal computer number, which is the second safety link. Third, he has a list of 50 transaction numbers, of which he can choose any when making a transaction.

At all events, computer banking is the safest form yet available, experts agree. The Bundespost is busy installing a number of videotex screens to enable giro customers to see at a glance how their account stands and to make electronic transactions.

(Der Tagesspiegel, 14 October 1982)

■ THE ENVIRONMENT

Problems involved in getting use from radioactive waste

Radioactive waste from nuclear power stations cannot simply be allowed to go to waste. Spent reactor fuel may be lethal and contaminated but it is much too valuable to throw away.

Recycling was strongly endorsed at a Bonn conference on nuclear waste disposal by atomic energy experts.

Uranium and plutonium from spent fuel rods could, they said, be made to meet much of Germany's energy needs if a reprocessing plant were built.

German nuclear power stations have accumulated 1,400 tons of uranium in the form of spent fuel rods. This stockpile is growing by 285 tons a year.

In a conventional light-water reactor 64 of the 200-odd fuel rods need on average to be replaced every year.

Spent nuclear fuel from Germany has so far been reprocessed at Windscale in England, Cap de la Hague in France and at a small pilot plant in Karlsruhe.

Windscale and La Hague are commercial operations. Karlsruhe is mainly a research facility used to gain experience in handling used fuel rods.

By no means all fissile material from German reactors has been reprocessed. Most is still in compact storage at nuclear power stations.

By the terms of the integrated nuclear waste disposal concept agreed by the Federal and state governments a major reprocessing plant with an annual capacity of 350 tons is envisaged.

Sites have been proposed, and are highly controversial, in locations including Kaisersesch, Rhineland-Palatinate, Frankenberg, Hesse, and Schwandorf, Bavaria.

The alternative to reprocessing would be to store fuel rods after use in suitable containers somewhere where neither uranium nor plutonium could escape into the biosphere.

But this method, speakers said, is nonsense in both economic and energy policy terms. The spent fuel can be reprocessed to produce new fuel rods.

Recycling can make it possible to reuse up to 40 per cent of the spent, waste material.

It may sound like some kind of perpetual motion, but the physical facts are fairly straightforward.

Plutonium is produced in every fuel rod in every reactor. Uranium that has not been subjected to fission also remains in spent rods.

At a reprocessing plant these two elements are separated from the remaining, unusable material. So used fuel can be processed to produce new fuel for reuse in power reactors.

Dr Hildenbrand, who works for a nuclear power station manufacturer, put it this way:

"The reactor has no way of telling whether it has been charged with new or reprocessed fuel rods."

Separation is, however, an extremely

complicated process, mainly because the material is so hot (in every sense of the term).

First, radioactive decay generates heat that makes it essential to provide constant refrigeration.

Second, the fuel rods still emit such a high level of radiation that they can only be handled by robots.

Humans must not make contact; they would immediately be given a lethal dose.

Security requirements are expensive but reprocessing still makes sound economic sense, says Dr Hildenbrand.

From the 64 fuel rods phased out annually at the average light-water reactor, fuel for 25 new rods can be recycled. So uranium for only the remaining 39 needs to be imported.

This did not apply to the fast breeder reactor. Its mixed oxide fuel rods could be reused in light-water reactors.

Dr Walter Schöller of the Karlsruhe

pilot project estimated at the end of the next decade by going all out to recycle used uranium.

He based his calculations on the coal equivalent as an energy unit. Average annual output of German fields is 87 million tons. It could, said, be increased to 95 million tons by 1992.

Over this period spent fuel could be reprocessed to recycle 11 million tons of coal equivalent.

Dr Schöller's assumptions were based on conventional mining techniques but other methods have for years been under consideration at Ruhrkohle, Ruhr Coal Mining Corporation, and its research laboratories.

Whether reprocessing spent fuel makes sense will depend to a large extent on the price of uranium in the market.

If the going price were \$30 per pound of uranium oxide, Dr Hildenbrand said, a year could be saved per ton of fuel.

That was exactly the difference in cost between inexpensive final disposal of untreated nuclear waste and recycling it to recycle fissile material.

Forst Rademacher

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 15 October 1982)

Forests in jeopardy as tree diseases take firmer hold

Tree diseases have taken an increasingly heavy toll this year. Between January and October the area affected has doubled.

The fir tree is not alone in facing extinction. It has been joined by nearly all major species: spruce and pine, beech and oak.

Enormous efforts must be made by Federal and state governments to ensure that the woodland third of the country's surface area is not denuded.

This point is made by an environmental and nature conservation association, BUND, which claims to be non-party in political terms.

A third of the country's woodland surface area is said already to be diseased. That is a total of two million hectares, or 5.2 million acres.

The tree toll has already stripped most of the Erzgebirge region of timber. A similar fate threatens the Bavarian Forest, the Fichtelgebirge, the Black Forest and Harz in the years to come.

A spokesman for the association, Hubert Weiger, agrees with many other experts that tree diseases are due to atmospheric pollution over the decades.

Acid rain is felt to have a lot to answer for. Herr Weiger, a forestry graduate, says environmental pressure makes trees less resistant to disease.

They are more sensitive to frost and drought and pests of all kinds.

He was strongly critical of politicians, saying the political response to this alarming trend was and remains pathetic.

Politicians and public opinion still fail to grasp the true extent of the imminent ecological collapse.

"Nothing," he says, "has yet happened apart from fine words and an insignificant increase in research fund allocations."

His organisations calls for an immediate emergency programme to bring tree deaths to a halt.

The sulphur dioxide output of power stations and other industrial plant (the

cause of acid rain) must be reduced drastically and fast.

BUND's detailed demands are: ● All power stations with a sulphur dioxide output of more than 2,000 grams per cubic metre of exhaust must immediately be equipped with sulphur capture facilities.

They must reduce the sulphur dioxide count to 400 milligrams at most in December 1980 by the security which could be done at the stroke of a pen, since most power stations in Germany are owned by the Federal or state governments.

All power stations in the country must be fitted out with desulphurisation equipment over a period of five years. That would cost about DM6bn, or less than the cost of a single Biblis nuclear power station.

● Before the end of the year 1980 sulphur pollution and furnace gas emissions must be toughened up. Sulphur dioxide output must definitely be reduced to 250 milligrams as a rule and milligrams as an exception.

● Talks must be held without delay with neighbouring countries to reduce atmospheric pollution that crosses national borders.

The European Community must mark regional found allocations for a pollution of power stations in member countries.

BUND would like to see these demands emerge as a major feature of the forthcoming general election campaign. It also plans to launch a country-wide Save the Forest campaign.

Environmentalists from Lower Saxony have pointed out to the Bpnd government that Buschhaus brown power station, under construction near Helmstedt, will emit 12,650 milligrams of sulphur dioxide per cubic metre of exhaust fumes through its 300-metre chimney.

This is 20 times higher than the recommended as a maximum by Environment Ministers.

(Hamburger Abendblatt, 8 October 1982)

THE CINEMA

Last year just a bad dream: festival redeems itself

The Mannheim film festival has regained some of its reputation: last year was hard to believe that the festival was internationally renowned because of its willingness to experiment.

Whether reprocessing spent fuel makes sense will depend to a large extent on the price of uranium in the market.

If the going price were \$30 per pound of uranium oxide, Dr Hildenbrand said, a year could be saved per ton of fuel.

That was exactly the difference in cost between inexpensive final disposal of untreated nuclear waste and recycling it to recycle fissile material.

Forst Rademacher

(Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger, 15 October 1982)

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In laborious detail Goupil links amateur and archive film material and acted scenes shot over a period of years.

The result is a film essay that establishes a unity of sense and sensibility in a striking demonstration of human sensitivity.

His freedom of style testifies to the influence of Jean Luc Godard, for whom Goupil worked as an assistant director for several years.

His film was awarded the Josef von Sternberg Prize at Mannheim.

One of the more striking entries in the main film category was heavenly Fields, a first film by Ian Pringle of Australia. He deals with the loneliness of modern man in an unusually clear and original manner.

It is a straightforward tale of two totally different men working at a remote satellite tracking station high up in the mountains.

They gradually grow dependent on each other, and the tale is given general validity by means of readily understandable metaphors.

The films is also impressive for its simple but exact shape. Pringle constantly and with great elegance oversteps the mark between dream and reality.

He seldom uses technical effects, preferring to achieve his effects by means of well-chosen film and soundtrack footage.

The main award of the city of Mannheim went to a Soviet entry, The Night is Short, by M. Belikov, who describes

China seemed at times too good to be true in a retrospective of Chinese films held as part of the Mannheim film festival.

Courteous, friendly people laughed and cracked jokes as they went about their work in the paddy fields. Selflessly they helped each other, practising solidarity and not just preaching it.

Even those who earned a little money on the side, thereby cheating the village community, came to see the error of their ways and regretted their egoistic behaviour.

They then decided to forgo their ill-gotten gains and hand over their capital to the community as a whole.

This idea of the good person, someone who may not be free of greed, envy and ideas of competition but consistently combats them, is a hallmark of the Chinese film.

The cinema is thus seen as a utopian version of what is not yet reality, an expression of the contrast between the idea and the reality.

This certainly applied to The Lin Family's Shop and Li Shuangshuang, films made in the late 1950s and early 1960s at the end of the first reconstruction phase in People's China.

Consistent development has not been a hallmark of the Chinese film industry. It would probably have been out of the question in a country where sweeping contrasts have been typical of chequered recent history.

The end of traditional feudal society, three civil wars, the struggle against the Japanese army of occupation and the cultural revolution have made a deep imprint in the work of Chinese film directors and scriptwriters.



From 'Exercises,' Anke Oehme's contribution to the nine films which make up 'Aus heiterem Himmel.' (Photo: Basile-Film)

the thoughts and feelings of a boy whose father was killed in the war.

He concentrates on an unusually sensitive use of his actors. There are several impressive figures, whereas the subject and the plot are shown in more conventional terms.

Werner Nekes preferred an entirely unconventional approach in his optical spectacular, Uliisses, which is a fantastic, confusing pictorial voyage of discovery into the interior of his mind.

Events take place at various levels and in various relationships that intermingle. The audience are presented with breathtaking twists in reality that defy the laws of time, place and logic.

Landscapes, faces and feelings are jumbled together so anarchically that the sequence of imagery would need to be seen three or four times at least in order to do it justice.

A gap between the idea and reality

The Chinese film got off to an extremely promising start in classics such as The Spring Silkworms, 1933, and The Divine Woman, 1934.

To this day neither film has lost its fascination and appeal. One is struck by the impressive way in which the world of the poor and the prostitute is portrayed.

Accusation and protest take shape from the situation and call for neither paths nor cramped ideology.

Types are outlined and characters shown who mature into personalities in the daily struggle for survival.

The variety of individuals bears witness to the influence of traditional Chinese opera. So does the swift succession of groups and individual performances.

The techniques used may show signs of borrowing from Japanese and Soviet filmmakers, but some Chinese filmmakers certainly seem to have evolved national authenticity.

This distinctive, independent form of expression is also apparent in Ravens and Sparrows, a film made in 1949.

The sufferings and grandeur of ordinary people are narrated, often ironically and humorously, with an air of detachment that is nonetheless loving.

But no attempt is made to make out the rifts in society to be harmless.

To judge by the films shown in

This Odyssey of Homeric myths, Joycean irritations and cinematographic history is the only genuinely experimental film that was an official entry at Mannheim this year.

The award for the best TV film went to Aus heiterem Himmel (Out of the Blue), a collective entry by nine West German women filmmakers.

It dealt with fear of war and the aftermath of nuclear destruction, but despite genuine commitment the nine episodes making up the film remained somewhat pallid and arbitrary.

So the jury's choice may mainly have been intended as a gesture of encouragement for women filmmakers, who in Mannheim as elsewhere were very much in the minority.

Günther Jurczyk
(Hannoversche Allgemeine, 15 October 1982)

Mannheim this changed radically after 1949, when the Communists came to power in Peking.

After the Communist take-over the cinema increasingly came to be used as a propaganda medium. Its role was to proclaim revolutionary ideas.

In doing so it sacrificed the psychology and character studies of earlier years, resulting in an unmistakable loss of quality.

A quite unbearable heroism, as in Never Him, the tale of a revolutionary composer, is typical of Chinese film output in the 1950s.

Mao's theory that art had a crucial part to play in re-education and propaganda was unimaginatively put into practice.

An aesthetic of revolutionary pathos arose, defining the individual as part of the movement or of the collective.

In the early 1960s filmmakers began to free themselves from this ideological constraint and deal with more general human topics such as relations between men and women at work or clashes between parents and daughters over the choice of a husband.

But the change was soon brought to a halt by the cultural revolution, which almost put paid to filmmaking in China from 1966 to 1976.

The Peking Film Academy had to close. Directors, writers and other artists were arrested. Some were sent to forced labour camps.

After the eclipse of the Gang of Four the Chinese film industry had to come to terms with the past, as it has so often had to do this century.

In The Cherry Tree, 1979, and Bear-

Continued on page 15

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
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■ SCHOLARSHIP

Historians grumble in the sands of possibility

Ten years ago, historians were convinced that history was dominated by classes and groupings that pursued their interests as if individuals were no more than passive stage props in an autonomous historic process.

It was, they thought, as if individuals were bedded in overpowering structures and acting under immutable laws that determined the course of events.

It was a time when historians had lost their belief in the uniqueness of events and when they bowed to sociology.

Today, they are bursting with self-assurance. As one of the delegates to the 34th German historians' Congress in Münster remarked, they are almost frightened by it.

The theme of the congress now at least allowed the question as to whether there might not be such a thing as crossroads in history after all — crossroads at which the acting personages could opt for one or the other route. It also allowed the question about the extent to which personalities can influence history — another thing that would have been unthinkable ten years ago.

Naturally, this does not mark a return to the concept of men making history. It marks a synthesis of a structural and individualistic interpretation of history.

But today's historians once more concede that individuals have a hand in shaping historic scopes of action, as shown by Rudolf Vierhaus, of Göttingen, in his opening address.

The question is: how are the weights distributed? The individual's, the group's and the party's political will affect such political conditions as the general system of values, rivaling political wills, foreign policy and economic exigencies and existing laws.

When the historians association formulated the theme for this year's congress, it could hardly have imagined how topical it would be.

The immediate future will be a prime example of the true extent of historic scopes of action, demonstrated by a Bonn government that considers the course of the past 13 years as wrong and is trying to rechart it.

The question now is, will the mere will be enough to break down existing structures that seem to point up a one-way street?

In summing up what was said in the discussion on the scope of action in the past 50 years, one can only arrive at the conclusion that there was none and that everything remained unchanged.

Not only was any scope of action extremely narrow but those who acted at the time were in fact unaware of it. But all this becomes evident only in retrospect.

Example number one: the scope of action of social democratic policy at the end of World War I. Germany, Austria and Russia were presented as examples at the congress. All three of them are countries in which the revolutionary freedom drive ultimately ended in fascist or communist tyranny. What did the politicians do wrong and could it have worked out differently?

In Russia, Dietrich Geyer of Tübingen explained, it was only the Bolsheviks who promised to fulfil the people's demand for peace, bread, land and self-determination. As a result, they won.

In Germany — and this has been said time and again — the revolution foundered on the fragmentation of socialist forces and the alliance with the old general staff. But then, it also foundered in Austria where none of these mistakes were made.

It is true that neither of these two countries seriously pursued the nationalisation of means of production and

that they continued to be administered by the old elite.

The point is that neither of their social democratic governments saw the general scope of action for a socialist restructuring of society. They were too frightened of civil war and pressure from enemy powers plus the disastrous supply situation, dramatic drop in industrial output and general economic woes.

To try and reconstruct the scope of action from today's vantage point would fall short of historic truthfulness (and justice).

Example number two: pressing needs and scope of action in the economic and social policy of the time between the wars. The main problem here was the Great Depression that started in America in 1929/30 and marked the watershed between Europe's pre- and post-war period. It also played a major role in promoting fascism in Europe.

What could have been done to prevent this? Was there any scope of action?

The answer to this is of topical interest. What makes it difficult to arrive at an answer, however, is that historians have to this day been unable to agree on the causes of the crisis. There are three rather irreconcilable theories.

The only point of agreement is that the crisis originated in the United States. From there on, the experts disagree, as Volker Hentschel of Mainz showed.

There is evidently a close link between political helplessness and intellectual busyness. What other explanation could there be for the tide of books on the Germans and their frame of mind at the very moment when the Germans have become uncertain about themselves and are trying to pinpoint their political position?

Questions as to German nationhood and the raison d'être of the Federal Republic of Germany and as to where the Germans are headed are being raised and then filed again — unanswered.

Day-to-day politics with its tiny steps and tactical finesse dominates — that is, until the discomfort over German self-definition breaks out again.

There can be no doubt that we are once more confronted with the question as to what makes the Germans unique. This might seem anachronistic in view of the internationalisation of politics, world-wide cultural exchanges and trans-national challenges — but perhaps the very lack of contour of international problems has been a contributing factor in the need for a satisfactory explanation of the collective identity of the Germans.

Such a need seems to exist abroad as well as a result of growing irritation over the uncertainties regarding the Federal Republic of Germany's position — be it out of fear of a new nationalism or be it out of a sceptical mistrust of an unnaturally underdeveloped patriotism on the part of the Germans.

The frequently embarrassing see-sawing in Germany's self-depiction between masochistic modesty and a pretentious paymaster attitude is evidently confusing both at home and abroad.

So are we perhaps a society full of intellectual unrest trying to find itself? If

The monetarists say that the money supply did not keep pace with the growth in the GNP.

The supporters of demand-side theories say that investment exceeded demand and that changes in the national income resulted in a decline of demand.

The third school of thought blames the crisis on breakdowns in the international economic and monetary system caused by tariffs, foreign exchange regulations, import quotas, export dumping and the lack of an institution that would have ensured international monetary balance.

Considering that even today we are divided on the roots of the crisis, how can we expect the politicians of the time between the wars to have recognised them — especially in view of the fact that they had no previous experience of a crisis of that magnitude?

As Hentschel sees it, the crisis was inevitable. It could only have been resolved on an international plane, which was outside the scope of politics at that time.

Two possible instruments with which to overcome the crisis were then unthinkable: departure from gold standards and deficit spending.

In the end, it was immaterial whether the crisis was combated politically (as in France and America) or whether the prevailing attitude was that of political abstinence.

This naturally also shakes the belief

The changing demands of German society

Helga Pross, *Was ist heute deutsch? Wertorientierung in der Bundesrepublik* Rowohlt Verlag, Reinbek 1982, 168 pp., DM24.

the results of empirical sociology are anything to go by, we are not.

Sociologist Helga Pross has presented an interesting and stimulating summary in her book *Was ist heute deutsch? Wertorientierung in der Bundesrepublik* (What is German Today? Value Orientations in the Federal Republic).

The author examines what most West Germans of today have in common with most of former eras and where they differ.

She concludes that, despite the importance attached to order and security, the old virtues such as discipline, obedience and subjugation are no longer paramount.

Today's Germans want private independence and want to pursue their personal interests.

So far as the political system as a whole is concerned, the Germans approve of democracy but are not passionately in favour of the present political order.

They have come to terms with it and are trying to realise their personal interests and engage in a pragmatic consensus.

All this has been nicely illustrated by the author; but the reader familiar with

that it was sound policy that about the long post-World War II economic boom. It also raises doubts the possibilities of today's economic policy, despite the fact that its elements have been improved.

Example number three: was the War inevitable? Scope of action in East-West conflict between 1945 and 1950.

This subject was dealt with in a discussion between Andreas Hillgruber (Cologne), Alexander Fischer (Münster), Geir Lundestad (Tromsø) and the political scientist Link (Trier).

The three historians were agreed that the Cold War was inevitable. Stalin's buffer zone of Soviet-dominated states on his Western borders and which there has been any amount of risk was only too willing to accept that zone as a Soviet sphere of influence (along the lines of Finland and Czechoslovakia until 1938).

Stalin's long-term objective was not an unpardonable moral offence. He was closely connected with the Europe. But the Americans decided to maintain their presence there.

The Soviet-American alliance held together only by the fight against Hitler. Once Hitler was defeated, ideological conflict broke out again.

Only Link made some critical remarks. Though he, too, considered East-West conflict inevitable, the question for him was whether it had to be a Cold War.

He suggested that America should formally have recognised East Europe as a Soviet zone of influence accompanied by attempts to pre-empt that it should have shared its knowledge with Moscow at a time when this was still an American policy.

the issues involved is confronted with repetitions of well known facts.

The equanimity with which West Germans cope with their everyday lives is contrasted with the psychological diagnosis of alleged severe neuroses.

Yet it is possible that day-to-day politics in Germany has disproved theses of the ungovernability and policy crisis of the country for the very reason that the pragmatic consequences exist and the many-faced problems are more in keeping with the agencies of a modern industrial society than are fundamentalist dreams.

Even so, intellectual unrest remains. There is a longing for a clear national identity, the syndrome of missed opportunities and continued hopes for a brilliant idea that would ease all political problems.

The intellectual distance from a political system, the romantic protest as a compensation for political frustration — all this could revitalise the venerable stock of traditions in German history.

Romantic relapses do not anchor themselves on the surface of political systems but in subterranean channels subjective attitudes.

As a result, Helga Pross' question "What is German today?" and her concentration on continuity and change values seem important as warning signals against a relapse into the old cliché of "typically German."

The Federal Republic of Germany road to itself seems longer than to people think. As a result, the question as to the identity of the Germans continues to be posed for some time.

Werner Weidenfeld (Die Zeit, 8 October 1982)

BEHAVIOUR

Attitudes change towards suicide: blame put on pressures of society

Vienna. In Germany the Suicide Prevention Association has been at work for 10 years.

Suicide as a Sickness of Society was the subject of its annual conference held this year in Munich.

Occasional headlines apart, Munich sociologist Kurt Wels said, next to none was unduly worried by the frequency of suicide.

Yet about 14,000 people a year commit suicide in the Federal Republic of Germany, or more than die in traffic accidents.

Suicide is increasingly widespread among the over-65s, but a large number of young people also take their own lives. Only accidents are a more frequent cause of death among young people.

Besides, official statistics account for only a fraction of attempted and successful suicides. The number that never come to light is very high.

Lack of interest in these facts was due, Herr Wels said, to suicide still being taboo. It was seen as behaviour detrimental to the prestige of the suicide and his next of kin.

It had social, legal and, at times, ecclesiastical repercussions. We also lived in an age hostile to the failure, the loser and the victim.

In a society geared to success interest and prestige were enjoyed by the healthy individual, by sport and beauty and

the International Association for Suicide Prophylaxis was set up in

the subject.

Along these lines is changing has lately been the subject of interdisciplinary research.

Sociology is a scientific discipline which there has been any amount of published since 1897, when sociologist Emile Durkheim published his book on the subject.

Durkheim pointed out that suicide was an unpardonable moral offence. It was closely connected with the conditions in which people lived.

He has suggested that the suicide in despair and hardship were the result of mental illness and led to emotional and the reversion of agricultural conflict broke out again.

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tached to school as the sole cause. An additional factor is that children are so made to feel, by their parents, that success is what counts that they lose all sense of their own worth if they turn out to be scholastic failures.

The survey indicates that it is immaterial whether or not the mother goes out to work. The crucial factor is the atmosphere in which the children grow up.

The loss of a loved one due to death or separation can trigger mental crises of the gravest kind.

Another category of potential suicides is young people who have had their first brush with the law, often only in connection with a minor offence.

There must also be no underestimating the lemming effect. Suicides often prompt others to follow suit.

"It is high time we set aside fairy-tale views of childhood," said Viennese psychiatrist Erwin Ringel, founder and Hon. Pres. of the International Association for Suicide Prophylaxis.

"In reality irresponsible behaviour by people drives the weak to despair, suppressing joie de vivre in early childhood, leaving us with schoolchildren who are largely unsuited for socialisation."

"Overwhelmed by neurotic symptoms, some already set foot on the road leading to the later meaningless protest of suicide."

There are a number of old chestnuts, stubbornly mistaken views, about suicide. One is that people who talk about it don't do it, another that someone who has attempted suicide once will not try again.

Every suicide bid must first be taken seriously, Herr Ringel stressed. It must be seen in deadly earnest. Eight suicides out of 10 give notice of their intention.

"We cannot escape the fact that nearly everyone who commits suicide says so beforehand and that there is no-one who stops them."

"There could hardly be a more devastating symptom of disturbance in human relations than this," he said.

In Britain the Samaritans had set up a network of advice bureaux all over the country at which over 20,000 lay helpers held out a lifeline 24 hours a day.

That, he said, was a really great achievement and an example others ought to follow.

Renate Jockle (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 14 October 1982)

Sex and old age are not a contradiction

Sex in old age is ignored and treated as though it didn't exist. But Max Planck research scientists have shown it does.

Münster. University research scientists have tested 23 grandfathers aged from 60 to 89, comparing them with 20 fathers aged 23 to 33.

Nine grandfathers were found to have sex at least once a week and 10 at least once every four weeks.

What is more, the Münster medics found that men in good health retained their reproductive capacity until a ripe old age.

Yet old people's need of love and tenderness is often either disregarded or not taken seriously.

The facts of life are often against them too. One is that over half the women aged over 65 are widows. There are 2.68 million of them, as against 709,000 single men in their age group.

Thirty-one per cent of women aged

65 and over are married, as against 76 per cent of men, and wives often have little or no understanding of their husbands' sexual needs.

And the Protestant Church has given thought to sex problems that arise for the aged in old people's homes.


Relations between the sexes in old people's homes are undoubtedly a problem, and a Swiss psychologist, Hans-Dieter Schneider, has published an article on the subject in a Protestant Church magazine, *Evangelische Impulse*.

The magazine is put out by a care for the aged unit of the social service organisation of the Protestant Church in Germany.

"Sexual intercourse may play a less important part in old age than earlier in life," he writes, "but it keenly interests some."

There ought to be no problems for

Continued on page 14



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Werner Weidenfeld (Die Zeit, 8 October 1982)

■ EDUCATION

New minister wants to tackle problems head on

Bonn's new Education Minister, Dorothee Wilms, intends being more than merely a statutory woman in Chancellor Kohl's Cabinet.

Education policy is essentially a *Land* affair, but unemployment among school leavers, a shortage of apprenticeships and overcrowding at universities are federal problems as well.

The tide of people heading for the universities rolls on: some 90,000 have enrolled for the winter semester of 1982-83.

But tens of thousands cannot study what they want to. All they can do is choose another field or wait.

Frau Wilms is working on a solution. To help her she can refer to a report commissioned by the former government which said that present-day students are not as bad as they are made out to be and that the universities are doing better than they are sometimes accused of.

It is a report that contradicts several widespread prejudices. For example:

- That students don't want to work.
- That universities are not educating.
- That the vast cost of the university system could be better used elsewhere.

The trouble is, it is difficult to measure university education qualitatively. Because of this many critics have made the mistake of judging by quantity.

For many pupils, going to university is a necessary extension to secondary education. They can learn, and it is the cheapest way of further training after high school.

There are more than 1m university students in West Germany and West Berlin. That is expected to increase by 300,000 by the end of the 1980s.

According to the report, the universities have been coping with the sheer numbers. They are efficient when compared with universities in other countries.

Graduation is 90 per cent, which shows, says the report, that students are willing to learn. Examination failure rate is 7.5 per cent across the board, although this varies from subject to subject. More law and business administration students fail; more medical students succeed.

Eighteen per cent of students change subjects during their studies, mostly in the first and second semesters. This figure is considered tolerable by the universities.

Continued from page 13

married couples in old people's homes, but what are the unmarried, who are in the majority, to do?

Marry, says Schneider. "We have examples of aged newly-weds who gained a new lease of life because being there for each other in wedlock gave their lives fresh meaning."

Yet next of kin often frown on the idea. What, marry at their age? It's not done, is it?

Couples and weddings at old people's homes are the exception. Ought the no-longer-weds to go in for extra-marital sex and expose themselves to the ridicule of others?

"Extra-marital sex can only be a

Three quarters of all graduates would go through their course all over again if they had the chance. But only 45 per cent thought that their studies would help their careers. This seems to indicate that universities should be more practical.

Average university education is five and a half years. If enrolment keeps on rising, this time might have to be shortened, says the report.

But politicians must not treat the university as a stepchild because the faculty alone is not up to the task.

Though there are still some university places available — varying from region to region and subject to subject — there will not be enough unless the universities are flexible.

In any event, the universities need support from the politicians if they are to cope. This means the politicians must approve temporary overcrowding and, that means, of course, more money.

Cash demands are bound to be resisted by Finance Ministers. As things stand, there are some tough times ahead. If they are to weather their problems, deep-rooted prejudices will have to be done away with and faculties and student bodies will have to be encouraged.

In view of mass unemployment, many of those who were born in the high birth-rate years have no alternative but to go to university — even if only a few find top jobs after graduation.

On assuming office, Frau Wilms said: "There is a widespread desire for higher education. Education is seen as an insurance for the future, and we must therefore try to achieve the best we can in terms of individual promotion and social justice despite shortage of funds."

"We must bring about a balance within the high birth-rate generation — a balance between those who study further and those who do not. We must also achieve a balance between those who are still studying at university and those who will want to enrol. What we need is a contract between the generations in terms of educational policy."

What matters now — not only for those immediately concerned, but for society as a whole — is to see how the politicians will reconcile educational ideals with realities.

Wolfgang Rieger
(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt,
17 October 1982)



Chewing It over

A Bremen school dentist, Wolfgang Schiamp, uses giant dentures and a toothbrush to demonstrate to schoolchildren why it is important to brush teeth. The video film of the lesson then is used to hammer the point home. Dr Schiamp is pictured using his video camera.

(Photo: Capa)

School life is 'catastrophic' charges pressure group

School life in Germany is described as "catastrophic" by the Hanover-based society for the protection of children (DKSB).

The secretary of the organisation, Walter Wilken, says a generation is growing up that is "psychologically unstable and pumped full of theoretical knowledge unrelated to practical life."

Besides "impractical, useless swatted knowledge," pupils have to put up with overcrowded school buses, unsuitable classroom desks and breaks that are too short.

He quotes a 1977 study made in the Saar which showed extensive psychological damage among the nation's school pupils — there are about 9m. He said the situation had become worse.

Sixty per cent of the children were afraid of tests, half had no appetite for breakfast and 40 per cent said there was much at school that frightened them.

They suffered physically because they had to sit still for hours and because there were only three hours of physical training a week.

Some 60 per cent of the children had depression problems, one-third were overweight and close to 25 per cent had cardiovascular problems.

"The earnest commitment of educa-

Bremer Nachrichten

tional policy makers of the 1960s turned into a depression in the field of education, and school has lost its humanity," says the DKSB.

More and more schools are trying to save the cost of school buses, forcing children "to use public transport or else to and from school with all the dangers that go with it."

The average workday (including homework and commuting) now is nine and in some cases 12 hours.

Education Ministers were planning to do away with 8,000 to 10,000 teaching posts "at a time when the effects of the Pill would enable us to have classes of an acceptable size," says Wilken.

A DKSB spokesman has put forward several demands that would enable schools "to do justice to their function."

"The school must orientate itself to the world as it is and the students they really are."

Schools should have a maximum of 500 students and classes should have no more than 25.

Like in most Western countries, almost kitschy tales of separation and reunions under tear-jerkingly involved. This could include working models of machines in play or a garden and animals in biology.

He called for a better teaching environment with more "gaiety, equality." School must be taken seriously, as has been the case up to now, he said.

The school should "educate" and not just instill intellectual experiment. Gifted and talented children should be furthered, the result could be enlightening in the best and most positive of the term.

The society also calls for "positive attitude towards failure" and attitude that would encourage performance and do away with the fear of failure.

Günter Dehn
(Deutsches Allgemeines Sonntagsblatt,
10 October 1982)

(Bremer Nachrichten, 13 October 1982)

SOCIETY

Organisation helps victims of violent crime

membership of an organisation formed in 1977 to help victims of crime has increased from an initial 15,500.

The White Ring (White Ring) has spent the last five years. Of this, DM7.7m has been used to help 4,000 victims or relatives of victims of violent crime. Finances mainly from donations. A amount comes from court fines.

17 founders of the organisation are satisfied with their efforts, although they have reason to be. They have the financial and spiritual support of 140 branches and 450 workers is no more than a drop in the ocean.

One million crimes a year are committed in the Federal Republic. Material damage is an estimated DM120bn.

Thousands of thousands of victims, many the direct or indirect victims of murder, manslaughter, robbery, rape and battery and rape, need legal and financial and legal assistance without red tape. State compensation under new legislation is inadequate.

The White Ring Chairman Eduard Zimmermann deplored this at the 5th annual meeting of the organisation in Bonn.

He called for an amendment of the Compensation Act, under the terms of which Bonn and the states paid out a total of DM12.8m to crime victims last year.

Saxony's Interior Minister Egbert Wollmann and the parliamentary secretary at the Bonn Interior Ministry, Horst Waffenschmidt, agreed to amend the Compensation Act was inadequate and full of loopholes.

The Act provides for permanent compensation only if the crime victim has a disability and his earning capacity is reduced by at least 25 per cent.

Waffenschmidt said that even today the victims of crime are victimised a second time because nobody cares about them and even the hope of material compensation frequently fails to materialise.

We must not only understand the problems of the criminal but those of the victim as well.

It was one of the merits of the White Ring to have made this clear.

Continued from page 11

Grudge in the Ba-Shang Mountain. It sought to do so but carried conviction.

plots are emotionally exaggerated, almost kitschy tales of separation and reunions under tear-jerkingly involved. This could include working models of machines in play or a garden and animals in biology.

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Alfred Huber
(Mannheimer Morgen, 11 October 1982)

of crime before 16 May 1976 when the Act came into force.

There is also no cover for those who have suffered material damage, those who were victims of crimes abroad and foreigners who have for years been living and working in this country — unless there is reciprocal agreement to that effect with their home country.

Zimmermann stressed at the meeting that all parties represented in the Bundestag had promised an amendment of the Compensation Act.

The White Ring must now take the government parties by their word and insist that the promise be honoured.

It would be wrong, he said, to speak of the financial burdens that would result from an amendment of the Act. Instead, we can only speak of old debts that have never been settled.

In purely financial terms, crime victims have made a huge advance payment by the very fact of becoming victims. In other words, those who have been spared this fate are their debtors.

Zimmermann called for a clause that would make it obligatory for government authorities to do more in safeguarding the interests of crime victims.

He conceded that there have been improvements in this respect in the police, the judiciary and welfare departments. But by the same token politicians paid only lip service to the necessity of looking after the victims of crime.

White Ring now hopes that the change of government in Bonn will bring about new priorities in the equalisation of burdens between victims and non-victims and more understanding and less added discrimination for victims. It is also hoped that protection from crime will improve.

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We must not only understand the problems of the criminal but those of the victim as well.

It was one of the merits of the White Ring to have made this clear.

(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung für Deutschland, 18 October 1982)



Eduard Zimmermann... seeks changes in compensation laws. (Photo: ZDF)

Bitter pill for medical students

The examination papers of 183 Würzburg, Bavaria, medical students have been lost. They disappeared somewhere between Würzburg and Mainz, where they were to have been marked.

Eighty of the students have now sued the state of Bavaria. Their lawyer says that all papers (they are preliminary examinations) should be declared successful.

He says the students should at least be allowed through to the next examination stage without precondition.

The students, by handing over the papers, had "placed them in the exclusive care of the defendant (the state of Bavaria) and thus have fully complied with their exam obligations. The onus to prove examination failure therefore rests with the defendant."

Bavaria's Interior Minister, Herr Gerold Tandler, said he had "all sympathy" with the students, but the only legal solution was for them to sit the examination again.

The national failure rate is 22 per cent, so the Interior Ministry says that, arithmetically, 40 of the Würzburg students have failed.

The lawyer reserved the right to file damages claims for his clients if the exams are not accepted.

He charged government officials with having been negligent, as evidenced by their "inability to find the exam papers."

(Frankfurter Rundschau, 15 October 1982)

Constitutional hurdle

Continued from page 3

would have vote. Meanwhile, the existing cabinet would act as a caretaker government.

If no candidate gets an absolute majority during these two weeks, the members of the Bundestag must vote again. Now the candidate with the most votes would be considered voted in.

It would now be up to the president to either appoint the elected Chancellor or to dissolve parliament.

The complicated procedure under Article 63 presupposes firm agreements between all political parties represented in the Bundestag. At least one of the votes on a chancellorship candidate would then be no more than a farce.

And it is hard to imagine that the president would lend himself to a procedure that would harm the image of his own office.

There now still remains a third approach: the chancellor could ask for a confidence vote under Article 68 of the Constitution. If the vote — as desired by the government — is negative the president would know that the Chancellor has the majority for a positive vote of confidence; but even so he would have no choice but to go along with the political will of the parliamentary majority. Such a rigged vote of no confidence is certainly not quite above board in terms of the Constitution, but it would be less of an evil than forgoing national elections altogether.

The promised elections in March must take place if our democratic institutions are to remain credible; and Article 68 offers a reasonably constitutional way out. If is the way Kohl is likely to opt for.

Bettina Wieselmann
(Stuttgarter Nachrichten, 20 October 1982)

Deadly dilemma over drug dealer's future

A Singapore Chinese is fighting to stay in jail in Remscheid, in the Ruhr, where he has spent six years of an eight-year sentence for dealing in heroin.

Chee Seng, 37, is due for parole, but if he gets it he faces deportation. That may mean his death.

The Singapore authorities are likely to prosecute him again, despite the fact that the offence was committed in Europe. Anybody caught with more than 15 grammes of heroin faces the death penalty in Singapore. Chee was carrying 9.5 kilos when police arrested him on a train near the Dutch-German border six years ago.

A Bonn diplomatic legal adviser in Singapore says the fact that Chee has been sentenced in Germany is unlikely to stop Singapore from prosecuting him again.

The Federal Constitutional Court in Karlsruhe has now issued a temporary order preventing Chee's deportation, and German authorities wrestle with the problem.

The aliens authority in Remscheid wants to deport Chee. It is legal. A Constitutional Court ruling in 1964 decided that deporting a foreigner, even when it might result in a death sentence, does not contradict German law.

But the head of the Remscheid authority, Wilhelm Ellerbrake, has tried to get round the problem.

He has suggested to Chee that he go to another country instead of Singapore. The problem was, what country

wants to take a convicted drug trafficker?

Then the Bonn Foreign Office suggested that Chee could "escape" during a stopover in Malaysia. However, Chee thought that the Malaysians might deport him to Singapore.

Regardless whether they are threatened by the death sentence at home, foreigners who have committed serious crimes are deported on being released from prison.

In the 1964 ruling, the Constitutional Court justices argued that the fact that Germany has done away with the death penalty was binding for Germany only.

There is nothing in the German Constitution about the death penalty abroad. If there were any such provision it would amount to interference in the laws of another country.

The court was also worried about the consequences if it ruled differently: If the possibility of a death sentence at home were to prevent an ex-convict from being deported Germany would be stuck with the worst of foreign criminals while foreigners who committed less serious crimes could be deported. The judges felt that this would have been wrong.

As a result of this ruling, Chee's applications to the Administrative Court in Düsseldorf were unsuccessful. So was his appeal to the state assembly petition committee which threw out his case. Amnesty International has also been unable to help.

Jürgen Wessalowski
(Kölnischer Stadt-Anzeiger, 11 October 1982)